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Abstract
The idea that culture comprises resources that are used
has become a popular means to re-conceptualize the
culture–agency antinomy. However, the theorization of using
resources is fragmented. The present article reviews several
attempts to theorize resources, arguing that there has been too
much focus upon the resources themselves, while the notion of
use has been neglected. Focusing upon mode of use, as opposed
to the resources used, the article underscores the importance of
distinguishing between tools, which are used to act upon the
world, and signs, which are used to act upon the mind. The article
also argues for a distinction between non-reflective use, or
mediation, and reflective use of resources. Future research should
focus upon the transformation of tools into signs and the
transformation of mediation into reflective use. The article
concludes by discussing problematic issues that remain in
conceptualizing the use of resources.
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It is now widely accepted that creating an opposition between agency
and culture is unproductive. Previously, culture was often conceptual-
ized as a force external to the individual. Hegemonic norms, socializ-
ation practices, institutions, collective representations and discourses
were conceptualized as coercive and deterministic. Indeed, implicitly
it often seemed as if only an individual outside of culture could be fully
independent. However, more recently in anthropology (Bourdieu,
1990), sociology (Giddens, 1986) and psychology (Valsiner, 1987), there
has been a move to conceptualize individual agency as culturally
constituted: people do not act against culture, rather they act through
culture. A child growing up alone on the proverbial desert island is 
not free, but rather is enslaved by basic instincts. Culture enables
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distanciation from the environment and thus self-regulation, planning
and creative action.
At the core of this re-conceptualization are new words to describe
culture in terms of resources, tools, artifacts, capital and semiotic
mediators. Although each of these terms has its own context of use,
they all imply that culture is used. Things become resources, tools, arti-
facts, capital or semiotic mediators through being used in the course of
human action. The etymological origin of the term ‘resource’ comes
from Latin resurgere, meaning to splash back, resuscitate or rise again.
In the face of a rupture or great need, a resource enables adaptation
and restoration. It is this embeddedness in a ruptured goal-oriented
and meaningful activity which gives the terms resource, tool, artifact,
capital, mediator and semiotic mediator their particular value. Each of
these terms denotes something akin to a resource, namely something
that does not exist in itself but which comes into existence by enabling
meaningful human activity.
Examples of using resources abound. Vygotsky (1978, p. 51) provides
one of the classic examples in his discussion of using a knot in a
handkerchief as a mnemonic aid. Since then, the same idea has been
applied to the use of an abacus as either an external aid or an intra-
psychological representation to aid thought (Cole & Derry, 2005), to the
study of heuristics, mental strategies and rules of thumb (Gigerenzer
& Todd, 1999), and to the use of stickers, post-it notes and other
memory aids by people with declining cognitive faculties (Baltes,
1997). In the field of development, the concept of resources has proved
popular (Arievitch & Stetsenko, 2000; Neuman & Bekerman, 2001).
Children use transitional objects as emotional resources (Winnicott,
1968), argumentative styles as rhetorical resources (Psaltis & Duveen,
2006) and fingers, calendars and arithmetic as resources to mark time
(Wyndhamn & Säljö, 1999). In the field of education, there have been
studies on how education guards access to resources (Bourdieu, 1986)
and how certain resources are needed even to participate in education
(Rochex, 1998). Outside of the educational frame, religious fables,
traditional stories, films and pop songs can all provide resources for
dealing with life’s problems, from naming a child (Zittoun, 2004a) to
adapting to war (Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish, & Aveling, 2008). Soldiers
(Hale, 2008) and migrants (Markovitzky & Mosek, 2006) use personal
artifacts from home as resources for identity and memory, and
communities and nations use memorials to achieve a similar end
(Wertsch, 2002; Zittoun, 2004b). While we can take heart in the breadth
of contexts in which the re-conceptualization of culture is taking hold,
and with it the notion of resource, this very breadth is also a cause for
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concern. Do people use language (Austin, 1962) in the same way as
they use tourist guidebooks (Gillespie, 2006)? Is the mediation
provided by a pole-vaulting pole (Wertsch, 1995) equivalent to the
mediation provided by religion (Belzen, 1999)?
Moving beyond the antinomy between personal agency and culture
is a paradigm shift which is still in its early stages, and as such there
is considerable volatility in the terminology and conceptualization. The
terms resource, artifact, capital, tool, mediator, and semiotic resource
are overlapping and polysemic. The problem is that with too much
polysemy, there is little consolidation and advancement of the field
(Witherington, 2007; Zittoun, Gillespie, & Cornish, 2009).
The aim of the present article is to review conceptualizations of using
resources. We begin by reviewing efforts in the social sciences broadly
conceived, and then hone in on the unique contribution of cultural
psychology. In each case we review the main conceptual distinctions
that have been made. We argue that the majority of these conceptual-
izations have concerned themselves with distinguishing cultural
elements and that theorization of the way cultural elements are used
has been neglected. Accordingly, we focus upon the process of use
rather than the resources used and outline two distinctions. First, we
distinguish using a resource to act upon the world (tool) from acting
upon the mind of self or other (sign). Second, we distinguish non-
reflective use (mediation) from reflective awareness of the resource
being used (reflective use). Future research, we argue, should focus
upon the transformations between tools and signs, and between
mediation and reflective use. The article concludes by discussing some
of the outstanding problems in conceptualizing the use of resources.
Re-conceptualizing Culture in Social Science
Bourdieu (1986) has been at the forefront of re-conceptualizing the
individual–culture relation in the social sciences. He distinguishes
between economic, cultural, symbolic and social resources. Economic
resources include wealth and access to credit. Cultural resources refer
to the skills, knowledge and experience of an individual, which tend
to be cultivated by parents and educational institutions. Symbolic
capital is a resource in the sense that high status and prestige give
legitimacy and can enable certain forms of action (e.g., titles, degrees
and awards). Finally, personal connections and institutional contacts
can be drawn upon as social resources for getting things done.
According to Bourdieu, these resources can be accumulated as
capital. In the same way that economic capital can be exchanged for
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commodities and services, so exchanges are possible between these
forms of capital. Economic resources can be used to cultivate and
obtain social connections, to purchase education and thus cultural
capital, or to acquire prestige. Equally, social, cultural and symbolic
resources can be used to facilitate the accumulation of economic
capital.
Agency within Bourdieu’s scheme is culturally constituted. Cultural
capital, for example, constitutes the habitus of the individual provid-
ing a platform for action, while economic and social capital can enable
certain paths of action. However, Bourdieu’s focus is not upon the
active individual. Rather, the focus is upon the way in which capital
accumulates and social structures such as class are perpetuated. The
emphasis is on the way in which the socially constituted habitus, access
to resources, and the resources themselves are constraining rather than
enabling. In this sense, Bourdieu has a theoretical structure that
conceptually transcends the culture–agency antinomy, though in
practice he focuses upon the cultural and structural side of the
antinomy with little direct theorization of the way in which resources
are woven into activity.
Other scholars in the social sciences, such as Swidler (1986), have
been more focused upon the way in which resources are actually used.
Developing from Bourdieu, Swidler argues for a conceptualization of
culture as a ‘“tool kit” of symbols, stories, rituals and world-views,
which people might use to solve different kinds of problems’ 
(Swidler, 1986, p. 273). These can often be very contradictory and do
not necessarily lead to simple, clear-cut paths of action. For example,
the Bible is full of contradictory messages and as such does not
prescribe a monological and internally consistent way of life. For
Swidler, the Bible presents an open-ended range of meanings, some of
which may resonate with the reader and may thus be appropriated and
woven as resources into the reader’s path of action.
Swidler emphasizes the creativity with which individuals use
cultural resources. ‘A crucial task for research’, she argues, ‘is to under-
stand how cultural capacities created in one historical context are re-
appropriated and altered in new circumstances’ (Swidler, 1986, p. 283).
The point is that culture may provide resources for human action, but
exactly what constitutes a resource, and what it is used for, remains
open. Cultural artifacts created in one context can be used creatively in
a second context. In order to understand this process, Swidler (1986,
p. 284) argues, researchers need to focus upon ‘how culture is used 
by actors’ and ‘how cultural elements constrain or facilitate patterns 
of action’.
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In her analysis of the culture that exists in society, Swidler proposes
that it can be conceptualized as existing on a continuum from ideology
to tradition to common sense. The continuum is from highly articu-
lated and self-justifying belief and ritual systems (ideologies), to
partially articulated beliefs and practices (traditions), to completely
transparent and taken-for-granted cultural knowledge (common
sense). Common sense is taken-for-granted in the sense of seeming to
be a natural aspect of the world which needs no justification.
Swidler elaborates this distinction further by suggesting that during
settled periods, culture tends to exist as common sense. During such
times people unquestioningly use the cultural tools, and that use in
turn reinforces the ethos or values of the culture. In contrast, during
unsettled times both cultural ends and values are questioned. During
such periods culture needs to be justified and accordingly it becomes
discursively elaborated and thematized (Marková, 2003). As the
pattern of life becomes de-stabilized, so the culture which supports,
canalizes, and reproduces that pattern of life needs to become articu-
lated as a self-justifying ideology.
There are similarities between Swidler’s presentation and the ideas
developed by Moscovici (2008). Moscovici has revived Durkheim’s
concept of collective representations, but has developed it in a more
psychological direction. Contemporary societies are too heterogeneous
to support genuinely collective representations, Moscovici argues.
Rather, alternative and sometimes conflictual representations co-exist
(Gillespie, 2008). Such representations Moscovici calls social represen-
tations. Like Swidler’s concept of ideology, social representations exist
in a heterogeneous field of representations and thus often have to
become self-conscious in a discursive sense. The representations
become self-justifying—what Moscovici calls polemical represen-
tations. A second similarity concerns the role of representations as
resources for action. Like Swidler, Moscovici’s focus is upon the use of
knowledge within everyday life and especially how it is appropriated
from one context and used in a second.
Despite calls by Swidler to study ‘how culture is used by actors’ and
Moscovici’s encouragement to psychologists to incorporate sociologi-
cal theory, social scientific theorizing of resources tends to underplay
agency. For example, the concept of resource is repeatedly linked to
preserving social hierarchies. Instead of studying education in terms of
enablement, it is studied in terms of constraint. Educational insti-
tutions, family traditions and social networks control access to the
exclusive resources that enable high achievement (Farkas, Grobe,
Sheehan, & Shuan, 1990). Although important, such research has a
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tendency to once again undermine agency, and to fall back into the
traditional forms of cultural or sociological determinism.
The problem is partially disciplinary. The culture–agency antinomy
spans sociological (i.e., culture) and psychological (i.e., agency) levels
of analysis. The problem is compounded by the fact that the socio-
logical level of analysis was born out of a rejection of the psycho-
logical level (Durkheim, 1898). Since then, any attempts to explain
sociological phenomena in terms of psychology have been labelled
‘psychologism’ and resisted with all the motivation that an ontological
threat to the discipline can unleash (Moscovici, 1993). Upon these
fractured foundations it is almost impossible to build a nuanced theory
of how cultural resources are used. Any theory needs to be both socio-
logical or cultural, and psychological. Cultural psychology presents
one such approach.
Cultural Psychological Approach to Resources
The idea that culture mediates and enables human activity has been a
central tenet of the cultural psychological approach since the work of
Dewey (1896), Janet (1934) and Vygotsky (1978). What these and other
ancestors have bequeathed contemporary cultural psychology is a
commitment to a unit of analysis that entwines the individual actor and
culture into one model. The ‘unit of analysis’ in cultural psychology has
been conceptualized in terms of ‘acting-with-mediational-means’
(Wertsch, 1995), ‘activity’ (Leontiev, 1979), ‘symbolic action’ (Boesch,
1991), mediation within ‘activity systems’ (Engeström, 1999), mediation
within transitions (Zittoun, 2006a), mediation within ‘social acts’
(Gillespie, 2005) and many more (see Matusov, 2007). These units of
analysis are distinctive because they are focused upon individual action
with cultural means, and as such these models span both psychological
and sociological dimensions of the problematic.
A second defining feature of cultural psychology concerns the
emphasis on creative action, also mentioned by Swidler. Instead of
simply ‘using’ resources, actors within this tradition are often
described as ‘poaching’ or ‘renting’ (Wertsch, 1998, p. 145), and as
‘appropriating’ (Rogoff, 1995, p. 150) and ‘hi-jacking’ (Perriault, 1989,
p. 155). Using culture implies novelty. This novelty is not merely
restricted to the moment of use—it can feed back into the resource
itself. Resources are ‘marked’ by creative use and carry this history
into the future. Examples of creative appropriation, which have left
their trace, include using the telephone and instant text messaging 
for social communication. Instead of resisting these creative 
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dynamics of appropriation, there is now a move to encourage and
incorporate these dynamics into the development of new technologies
(Hyysalo, 2004).
Despite these two common features, cultural psychological research
is actually quite heterogeneous. Different sub-traditions have con-
ceptualized the use of resources in different ways. In the following, we
present three influential distinctions, namely: between cultural and
natural resources; between instrumental and consumptive objects; and
between primary, secondary and tertiary artifacts.
The distinction between natural and cultural resources has been
espoused by Baltes and his colleagues. For Baltes (1997), lifespan
development comprises three basic processes: selection of goals, optimiz-
ation of the resources, and compensation for the loss of natural resources.
The notion of resource designates any means to achieve the selected
goals. Compensation for the loss of natural physical and cognitive
ability, for example due to aging, entails using new resources, optimiz-
ing existing resources or changing one’s goals (Baltes, Lindenberger, &
Staudinger, 1998). Cultural resources are diverse, including cognitive
skills, motivational dispositions, socialization strategies, physical struc-
tures, economics and medical procedures. Examples of compensation
include Michael Jordan relying on special footwear to compensate for a
foot injury and Marie Curie asking colleagues for help. Whether
cultural resources are technologies, people, books or heuristics is not the
main issue. The key point is that cultural resources compensate for
deficient natural resources.
Symbolic Action Theory also gives a central place to goals, and
conceives of culture as enabling goal achievement. However, instead
of distinguishing resources on the basis of being natural or cultural,
Boesch (1991) distinguishes them in terms of the goal being achieved.
Specifically, he distinguishes between instrumental and consumptive
objects: ‘An instrumental object serves to produce a material or social
effect; consumptive objects serve to produce subjective-functional
effects of enjoyment. A hammer is an instrumental object; a cigarette is
a consumption object’ (Boesch, 1991, p. 194). Generally speaking, an
instrumental object is an object that is primarily intended to physically
enable practice (e.g., money), while a consumptive object, which affects
the subjective state of the person, is either an object of personal
meaning or one that satisfies desires (e.g., aesthetic objects). Like
Baltes’ approach, Symbolic Action Theory brings to the foreground the
enabling dimension of the cultural psychological approach. But Boesch
adds a more subtle distinction of the ends of action, recognizing that
some resources are ends in themselves (i.e., consumptive resources).
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Thus we can see that not all resources are used for compensation: some
are used for satisfaction.
Boesch (1991) presents the distinction between instrumental and
consumptive resources with an important caveat. Food may at times
be instrumental, in the sense of being used for survival, but it is often
aesthetic, and much of the time it is a combination of both. Equally,
while hammers are generally used for instrumental ends, children have
been known to use them to explore acoustic and destructive aesthetics.
The key point is that ‘the same object can be consumptive or instru-
mental, according to the use we make of it’ (Boesch, 1991, pp. 194–195).
A third conceptualization of using resources has been developed by
Cole (1996) and his colleagues. This approach borrows Wartofsky’s
(1979) distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary artifacts.
Briefly, primary artifacts are used for the reproduction of the species
and overlap with Boesch’s instrumental tools. Primary artifacts include
language, skills, mechanical tools and social organization. Secondary
artifacts are representations used to transmit primary artifact use.
These representations do not pertain to abstract knowledge, but rather
to a concrete ‘how-to’ knowledge of artifact use. Tertiary artifacts refer
to the imagination and are thus quite different from either primary or
secondary artifacts. Tertiary artifacts enable contemplation, reverie,
aesthetic perception, planning, rehashing and practising. These arti-
facts are derivative of praxis, echoing praxis, but the work of the
imagination is not passive: it may mediate praxis, leading to novel
primary and secondary artifacts.
The distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary artifacts has
become popular and is useful for conceptualizing the way in which
culture is both used and propagated (McDonald, Le, Higgins, &
Podmore, 2005). However, while the tripartite distinction is clear at a
conceptual level, it often becomes messy at the point of application. For
example, what sort of artifact is a school textbook? From the perspec-
tive of a teacher it might be a primary artifact for doing the work of
teaching and thus surviving. But, from the perspective of the content
it is a secondary artifact meant to transmit cultural knowledge. Finally,
from the perspective of a bored student it may be a basis for daydream-
ing and thus a tertiary artifact. This is the same point, mentioned
above, that Boesch (1991) makes about his own distinction between
instrumental and consumptive objects. The problem is also evident in
Baltes’ distinction between natural and cultural resources. For
example, a natural resource, such as one’s fingers or toes, can be used
as a cultural resource for counting (Ifrah, 1998). In both cases, creative
human appropriation undermines the attempt to align resources or
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artifacts with certain uses. Resources designed for one purpose, or
conceptualized as being for one purpose, may, in the next moment,
become appropriated and used for a second purpose. It seems that any
typology of resources based upon the resources themselves, rather than
the modes of use, will fail to capture these creative dynamics. Accord-
ingly, it is essential to distinguish what is used from how it is used, and
to focus theoretical effort on the latter.
Distinguishing Tools and Signs
In order to theorize how resources are actually used, it is necessary to
return to an often-overlooked distinction insisted upon by Vygotsky.
Vygotsky (1997, p. 61) was very critical of the loose way in which his
contemporaries were using the metaphor of ‘tool’. Specifically, he
criticized scholars, including Wundt and Dewey, for referring to
language as a tool. This metaphor, he argued, is over-stretched and
obscures the distinction between tools and signs. Tools and signs are
similar because they are both mediators. But this similarity conceals a
fundamental difference:
The tool serves for conveying man’s activity to the object of his activity, it is
directed outward, it must result in one change or another in the object, it is
the means for man’s external activity directed toward subjugating nature.
The sign changes nothing in the object of the psychological operation, it is
a means of psychological action on behaviour, one’s own or another’s.
(Vygotsky, 1997, p. 62)
Tools, according to Vygotsky, mediate our relation to the physical
world, and signs mediate our relation to our own or other minds. It is
important to note that Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and signs
is not based on the cultural element itself, but upon how it is used. For
example, a shovel can be used as a tool for digging a hole, but it can
also be used as an aide-mémoire, that is as a sign, if it is placed by the
door in order to remind oneself or someone else to dig a hole.
Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and signs, although often
overlooked, persists in a surprising way. This fundamental distinction
characterizes the two main sub-traditions of research in cultural
psychology. These two traditions are the activity tradition and the
semiotic mediation tradition (Valsiner, 2007, pp. 31–32). Simplifying
somewhat, the activity tradition prefers to write about tools and empha-
sizes material mediators, while the semiotic mediation tradition prefers
to write about signs and tends to emphasize semiotic mediators. Let us
consider these traditions in turn.
9
The activity tradition emphasizes the mediation of action in the
world, focusing upon mediators that enable organizations to function
(Engeström, 1987), pole vaulters to jump (Wertsch, 1995) and cookie
sellers to sell cookies (Rogoff, 1995). Within this tradition there has
been a tendency to suppress Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and
signs, and instead to use more general terms such as ‘artifacts’ (Cole,
1996, Ch. 5), ‘mediational means’ (Wertsch, 1998, p. 17) and ‘cultural
artifacts’ (Gauvain, 2001, p. 126). In these and many other cases, there
seems to be a shying away from the distinction between tools and signs
for fear of invoking a Cartesian dualism between mind and matter.
Accordingly, the distinction between tools and signs has been allowed
to fade. Or, more critically, one could argue that inflating the terms tool,
artifact or mediational means, to the extent that they subsume the
concept of sign, enables a conceptual sleight of hand that redirects 
the research gaze from intra-psychological dynamics and semiotic
mediation to external dynamics and tool-based mediation, thus side-
stepping the problem of internalization (Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish, &
Psaltis, 2007).
The semiotic mediation tradition has preferred to focus upon the
semiotic mediation of thought and action. In Vygotsky’s own termin-
ology, the focus is signs, not tools. Accordingly, in this tradition one
can find studies of distanciation (Valsiner, 2003), emotional experience
(Zittoun, 2006a), internal dialogues (Hermans, 2002; Josephs, 2002),
implicit mediation (Wertsch, 2007) and self-reflection (Gillespie, 2007a).
While this research tradition tends to focus upon intra-psychological
mediators of thought, there are also examples of research that examines
the external mediators of thought, and even the transition between the
two (Cole & Derry, 2005). The critique of this tradition is that it risks
re-creating the Cartesian dualism between world and mind. The
problem is that if semiotic mediation can be an intra-psychological
process, then what ontological status does that process have vis-a-vis
external forms of mediation?
At this point there is no need to resolve this lingering theoretical
debate. Our approach is more pragmatist (Cornish & Gillespie, 2009).
We want a broad understanding of using resources that can transcend
the culture–agency antinomy, and thus we need to consider the use of
both tools and signs. That both forms of use exist is abundantly evident
in the voluminous literature of both traditions. We need to leave
theoretical problems about terminology to catch up with empirical
observation, and we should not let sensible research get held back by
theoretical confusion. Any comprehensive theorization of using
resources needs to include both tools and signs.
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Distinguishing Mediation and Reflective Use
While Vygotsky’s distinction between tools and signs is conceptually
clear, there linger other distinctions in his writings which are less clear.
Wertsch (2007) provides a subtle analysis of the different ways in which
Vygotsky uses the concept of mediation. According to Wertsch, two
distinct modes of mediation can be distinguished, which he calls
implicit and explicit mediation. Explicit mediation tends to entail
mediation by external objects, people or signs, and the mediation is
often intentional and done with awareness (2007, p. 180). Implicit
mediation tends to be internal, semiotic and is rarely the object of
consciousness or reflection (p. 185).
While Wertsch is correct in calling for an analysis of mediation and
in pointing out that Vygotsky uses the term in different ways, we
suggest that he has identified more than two types of mediation. First,
there is a distinction between that which is internal and that which is
external. Second, there is a distinction between reflective and non-
reflective mediation. The problem is that these two distinctions can and
should be dissociated. For example, one can have intra-psychological
and highly self-reflective mediation. Wertsch seems to recognize as
much in his analysis, but he does not pursue the distinction.
According to our analysis, the distinction between tool and sign is
more precise than the distinction between internal and external. Signs
can be both internal and external. Signs that operate upon other minds
always have an external dimension, otherwise they could not be
communicative. Signs which operate upon self are often internal 
(e.g., self-talk) but need not be (e.g., a knot in a handkerchief as an 
aide-mémoire). Having dealt with this distinction above, in our
discussion of tools and signs we want to focus upon the distinction
between non-reflective and reflective mediation.
The distinction between non-reflective and reflective resource use
has not only been raised by Vygotsky. The distinction is evident in the
writings of both Swidler and Moscovici, discussed above. The distinc-
tion is also central for Dewey, James and Mead, who were very
concerned with reflective consciousness, theorized in terms of I/me
dynamics arising in the stream of thought. Reflective self-awareness
has often been observed in empirical research (Gillespie, 2007b), as has
the reflective use of semiotic resources (Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie,
Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003).
What is meant by the reflective use of a resource? The key issue is
whether the resource itself or the use of the resource is in the conscious
awareness of the actor. The non-reflective user of a resource will be
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focused upon the minutiae of the task, the ends to be achieved, or
indeed, freed by non-reflective use, the user may be thinking about
something completely unrelated to the task. The reflective resource user,
however, forms a different psychological relation to the task. Their mind
is focused upon the resource being used and the mode of use. Reflec-
tive use of a resource, whether tool or sign, entails distanciation from
the resource and its use. Such distanciation necessitates a second-level
semiotic platform for conceptualizing the resource and its use.
This distinction between non-reflective and reflective resource use is
particularly dynamic. In the course of an activity, reflective awareness
of resource use may come and go. The reflective awareness needs to be
temporary, because so long as the resource itself is the focus of aware-
ness it is difficult to proceed with the task. Rather, the reflective phase
is a moment of stepping out and reorganizing the task such that
attention can be turned back to doing the task, perhaps in a new way.
Using Resources
Table 1 represents the emerging conceptualization of using resources.
Down the left hand side is the distinction between tools and signs.
Table 1. Conceptualizing the mediation and reflective use of tools and signs
Use
————————————————————————————
Mediation Reflective use
(mind is focused upon the goal, (mind is focused upon the 
not the mediational means) resource and its use)
Resources Tools Tool mediation: Reflective tool use:
(acting on Being absorbed in any action Reflecting upon tool 
the world) directed at the world mediation
Examples: Examples:
Driving, building, fixing, Changing tool, fixing a tool,
digging, eating etc. learning to use a tool etc.
Signs Sign mediation: Reflective sign use:
(acting on Absorbed in action that is Thinking about the signs 
mind of self mediated by signs that are mediating action
or other) Examples: Examples:
Habitual use of discourse or Choosing what clothes to 
imagery to communicate wear for an interview
Talking oneself or someone The poet deliberating over 
else through a task a choice of words
Intra-psychological planning to Deciding to tie a knot in a 
go on holiday handkerchief to remember 
Dreaming, reverie, aesthetic something
appreciation Choosing to listen to some 
calming music when stressed
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Across the top of the table is the distinction between mediation and
reflective use. Making the tool/sign and mediation/reflective use
distinctions orthogonal results in four categories: tool mediation;
reflective tool use; sign mediation; and reflective sign use. The follow-
ing sub-sections explore each of these four possibilities.
Tool Mediation
Tool mediation concerns the non-reflective use of a resource to affect a
change in the world, not in the self’s or other’s relation to the world.
An example is the way in which an experienced driver changes gear
while absorbed in driving (Leontiev, 1979). In such an activity, the
actual operation of the gear stick is outside of the consciousness of the
driver, whose awareness is at the level of the action, namely slowing
down or accelerating. In such moments the driver is absorbed (Benson,
1993) in the activity, and the tool-mediated activity itself is not an object
of awareness. The artist, for example, in moments of absorption is
thinking of the art to be formed and not of the tools used in the process
(McCarthy, Sullivan, & Wright, 2006). In tool mediation the tool is a
pure medium, invisibly enabling and shaping the ongoing action.
During tool mediation there may be reflective awareness, but it is not
of the tool use; rather, it is likely to be of the details of the action and
the immediate goal. For example, a driver may have reflective aware-
ness of bends in the road or the goal of overtaking the car in front. 
But in such cases the use of the car as a tool remains at the level of
mediation and does not enter reflective awareness. In Leontiev’s (1979)
terminology, the use of the car as a tool remains at the operational level,
while the mind of the actor is at the molar level of the action being
performed and the goal to be achieved.
Reflective Tool Use
If while driving the car, the driver moves to change gear but finds the
gear is stuck, then there is likely to be a shift of attention from the task
being achieved to the means of achieving the task (i.e., the car as a
resource). The driver may think: ‘Did I move the gear stick in the right
direction?’; ‘Has this happened before?’; ‘Is the engine still running?’;
‘What gear am I in anyway?’; and so on. In this moment, the actor’s
relation to the tool becomes an object in mind. In Leontiev’s (1979)
terminology, the operation of the gears becomes a goal-directed action.
Within this reflective mode, double-loop re-conceptualization of the
tool and the mode of use are possible. The driver learning to drive must
make each change of gear a deliberate and conscious action, deter-
mined by an explicit awareness of the sound of the engine, speed and
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unfolding situation on the road. Reflective tool use is particularly
dynamic. It is a phenomenological experience of distanciation from
tool use which occurs momentarily against a backdrop of embedded-
ness within the task. Although it is easy to observe this phenomeno-
logical experience in oneself, it is difficult to gather empirical data on
it as it is experienced by others.
Sign Mediation
Sign mediation concerns the use of signs not to effect a change in the
world directly, but rather to alter one’s own or someone else’s relation
to the world. Sign mediation is the mediation of mind. Examples of
sign mediation of the mind of the other include many everyday
communicative contexts and subsume what have been called
communicative resources. When someone says ‘I am depressed’, they
are rarely making a propositional statement about their own being;
rather, they are usually trying to effect a change in their relation to
someone else (Rorty, 1999, p. xxiv). For example, they may be trying to
make the interlocutor more sympathetic. If such an utterance has the
desired effect, then the interlocutor may put on some uplifting music,
which itself would be another example of sign mediation, except this
time it would be oriented to the mind of the person claiming
depression.
If however, the music is put on for oneself, then it would be an
example of using music to mediate one’s own feelings and emotions
(Lewis, 1982; Zittoun, 2007). Research on symbolic resources (Zittoun,
2006a) has directly addressed sign mediation of self by studying how
books and films enable imaginary and aesthetic experiences and
support emotional and identity regulation. This domain includes most
tertiary artifacts in Cole’s terminology, that is, artifacts that enable
reverie, daydreaming, dreaming, planning and self-talk. What is being
mediated in these examples can be anything from self’s future action
to self’s emotional state.
Reflective Sign Use
The reflective use of sign resources to act upon the mind of others is
more common than one might initially suspect. Anyone who learns
about rhetorical strategies, thinks about how to give a speech or write
a letter or article, prepares to tell a joke or studies management is likely
to be engaged in the reflective use of semiotic resources. Examples
from the literature include young children’s selective use of argu-
mentative strategies (Tartas & Muller Mirza, 2007), teenagers’ careful
consumption of the right magazines in order to be part of a peer group
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(Hijmans, 2004), and community organizers encouraging sex workers
to conceptualize their predicament using the discourse of workers’
rights (Cornish, 2006).
Vygotsky’s (1978) classic example of tying a knot in a handkerchief
in order to remember something is an example of the reflective use of
a semiotic resource to act upon the mind of self, or more specifically,
to act upon self’s future relation to the world. Further examples
include: referring to a book on dream symbolism to interpret one’s
dreams; referring to a book on first names to choose a name for a new
child (Zittoun, 2004); or deciding to make an explicit comparison
between one’s own life experience and that found in a novel (Zittoun,
2006b). Equally, consider tourists who deliberate which guidebook to
buy for their travels (Zittoun et al., 2003), or who choose to read novels
about their destination before departure (Zittoun, 2006a). In these
examples, the difference between signs and tools is underscored. The
tourist reading about their destination country before departure is not
acting upon that country; rather, they are acting upon their own
psychological relation to that country.
Between Mediation and Reflective Use
The distinction between tool mediation and tool use enables us to ask
the interesting questions of how, why and when mediation becomes
reflective use and vice-versa. The literature suggests a number of
reasons (Gillespie, 2007a). First, the reason most often mentioned is
that a rupture halts ongoing action and stimulates reflection. This can
be the gear change producing an unexpected result, the choice of which
coins to use to pay for a taxi (Peirce, 1878), or unsettled times (Swidler,
1986) such as war (Zittoun et al., 2008). In these instances there is a
classical rupture-transition process in which the actor’s taken-for-
granted mode of action breaks down and the actor has to question both
the resources being used and their mode of use (Zittoun, 2006a).
Second, reflective use can also arise due to overlapping or contra-
dictory representations (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999), where the action orien-
tation associated with one representation stimulates the alternative
action orientation. Third, reflective use can be stimulated by the gaze
of others, such as when tourists become aware of themselves as
camera-touting tourists (Gillespie, 2006). Relatedly, because when
people speak they usually hear their own utterances, it may be that
hearing their own utterances provides enough distance from those
utterances to stimulate reflection upon those signs as mediators being
used (Gillespie, 2007a). Fourth, it may be that the very efficacy of the
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resource stimulates awareness of the resource. For example, Zittoun
(2006b) reports on a young man experiencing a difficult transition, who
found a novel to be a useful resource by active reflection upon the
relations between the novel and his own life narrative. Finally, there
are also socially sanctioned moments of creativity, when the traditional
constraints upon action are removed. For example, play (Harris, 2000),
pilgrimage (Turner & Turner, 1978), tourism (Ryan & Hall, 2001), fiction
(Vygotsky, 1971), poetry (Abbey, 2007), carnivals and festivals provide
spaces in which existing relations can be re-imagined, reversed or
rejected. In these liminal modes of activity, alternative paths of action
and thought are promoted, thus potentially stimulating novel and
reflective uses of resources.
The reverse movement, from reflective use to mediation, is fairly
straightforward. Once the work of reflection is done, and the resource
or its use has been satisfactorily re-conceptualized, then activity
proceeds and the mind refocuses upon the details of the goal-directed
action, and the resource passes into pure mediation.
The movement from mediation to reflective use and back again
might enable a double-loop questioning of the activity or tool. Reflec-
tion upon the activity or tool entails looking from a new perspective,
which may lead to a modification of the resource or the mode of use.
Returning to Leontiev’s (1979) example of learning to drive a car, we
know that initially each action, such as changing gear or speed, is
guided by reflective awareness and self-monitoring. Then, by virtue of
practice, these actions become automatic and operational, thus
enabling the mind to focus less upon the mediational resource and
more upon the action being done. In the case of sports professionals,
the case is often more complex, because their habits of running or
swimming, for example, often need to be made explicit before being
re-modelled (Behncke, 2005). Once reflected upon and thus regulated
they can be modified, with the aim that these modified patterns of
behaviour will settle back into the domain of habit.
Future research focusing on this transformation needs to obtain data
on the stream of consciousness (James, 1890), as the objects in that
stream move from embedded participation in the task to distanciation
or reflection upon the resources being used and then back again to
embedded participation (Valsiner, 2007). Such dynamics are difficult to
observe directly. Talk-aloud protocol can be used during the course of
activity (Valsiner, 2003; Wagoner & Valsiner, 2005). Microgenetic
methods, which try to slow down the movement of thought, might also
provide a means for exploring the shifts in reflective consciousness.
Alternatively, one can analyse interviews in search of moments of
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reflection and the movement of thought (e.g., Gillespie, 2006;
Moscovici, 2008, Ch. 10).
Between Tools and Signs
What is a sign? And how is it different from a tool? If signs cannot act
upon the world directly, but only upon the mind, then do they belong
to a distinct ontological realm? If so, does this realm co-exist with the
material realm, yielding a dualism akin to that described by Descartes?
Questions such as these have unfortunately led to the suppression of
the distinction between tools and signs. By making the distinction
between tools and signs fundamental to our conceptualization of use,
we now need to address these difficult questions.
The relation between tools and signs, and especially the question of
how tools might become signs, was of central concern to Vygotsky
(Vygotsky & Luria, 1994). According to Cowley, Moodley and Fiori-
Cowley (2004), there is no satisfactory way to explain how this
emergence occurs. Vygotsky (1997, p. 104) himself presented a brief
analysis of pointing, which is meant to illustrate how pointing-for-
reaching becomes pointing-for-communicating (i.e., a sign). But his
analysis is too brief to reveal a mature theory (Zittoun et al., 2007).
While no conclusive statement can be provided on the way in which
tools become signs and vice-versa, we want to outline briefly how a
Meadian perspective might aid future research in addressing this
important question.
According to Mead (1922; Gillespie, 2005), between tool use and sign
use there is an intermediate form of social action. This intermediate
form is only conceivable when we take a perspectival view on the
social world (Mead, 1932). Beginning with direct action on the world,
Mead points out that although this action is directed at the world by
the actor, it may have meaning for an observer. That is to say, the action
may have two different meanings from the two perspectives. In
relation to the actor, the action is directed at the material world. But in
relation to the observer, the action becomes a symbolic index of conse-
quence. Such action Mead described as symbolic, and he differentiated
it from significant symbolic action. Symbolic action is action that is mean-
ingful to an observer in some way, of which the actor is unaware.
Consider a driver who pulls out onto a street unaware that they have
just cut off a bicyclist, who narrowly escapes an accident. The driver,
in such a situation, is embedded in the task of driving and unaware
that their actions have the meaning of being ‘incompetent’, ‘aggressive’
or ‘dangerous’ from the perspective of the bicyclist. The driving is
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symbolic for the bicyclist but not for the driver. Significant symbolic
action, on the other hand, is communication proper, where the actor is
aware of the impression an action creates in the mind of an observer,
and thus uses the action to affect the mind of the observer deliberately;
for example, wearing a smart suit in the knowledge that other people
will think it smart, or speaking to people in full knowledge of what one
is saying.
Consider the following more elaborate example. John lives on a
street with a lot of rubbish and he has been trying to arrange for local
residents to have a day of street cleaning, but he has met with little
success. Then, giving up on his neighbours, John goes out to begin
cleaning up the rubbish himself. He uses a bag and shovel as his tools
for acting directly on the world. However, as he is working he notices
that his neighbours are looking at him from between the curtains, and
he can imagine their shame for not helping. In order to encourage these
feelings and possibly stimulate his neighbours to help, John continues
cleaning rubbish late into the night. Although the ongoing behaviour
is the same, the bag and shovel have become signs—signs of his
working, and he is using them to affect the minds of his neighbours.
In this case, although the action (cleaning) remains constant, the action
moves from tool use to sign use. However, just because John is trying
to communicate with his labour, it does not follow that he will be
successful. If we look at the situation from the perspective of his 
neighbours, then in one house we might find a family who thinks John
is wasting his time because the council is scheduled to come and do
the cleaning tomorrow, and in another house we might find people
who see John’s behaviour as sanctimonious, self-righteous and holier-
than-thou. In so far as John’s neighbours feel guilt, then his action is
significantly symbolic, but in so far as his neighbours perceive
alternative meanings, then his action is only symbolic. If John were to
become aware of these alternative meanings, then his action would
become increasingly significantly symbolic, and he might even cease
the cleaning.
Incorporating Mead’s distinction between symbolic and significant
symbolic action into our present scheme means recognizing symbolic
action (in Mead’s terminology, not in the terminology of Symbolic
Action Theory) as an intermediary between action and significant
symbolic action (or sign use). This intermediary is important because
it defies the idea of a Cartesian dualism. In symbolic action we find half
a sign process, and it is not halfway to being a different kind of onto-
logical stuff. Rather, it remains partial because the perspective that
links the actor to the object is not integrated with the perspective 
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that links the other to the actor’s action. The actor’s action is meaning-
ful to the other, but the actor is not aware of this meaning and thus is
not in control of the sign process. Significant symbolic action entails the
actor being aware of the meaning of their action from the perspective
of the observer. Thus, instead of moving between ontological realms, a
Meadian conception entails only a movement between perspectives.
Considerations for the Future
That the social sciences in general and cultural psychology in particu-
lar are fragmented fields of research has often been observed (Valsiner,
2007; Witherington, 2007). One area of particular heterogeneity, overlap
and polysemy, we have argued, concerns the idea of using resources.
Our aim, in the present article, has been to review the main concepts
being used and to tentatively draw out the distinctions between tool
and sign, and between mediation and reflective use.
Unlike many of the distinctions reviewed, the distinctions we have
emphasized concern the uses of resources, not resources used. Accord-
ingly, the same resource can appear in any of the four modes of use.
Consider again the case of the shovel. While absorbed in digging, the
shovel is a mediational tool. If the shovel breaks, or causes trouble, it
may stimulate reflective use. If the hole is not dug before the end of
day, the digger may choose to leave the shovel in a notable place, either
as an aide-mémoire for the morning or as a reminder for a second person
to make a contribution. Finally, the shovel may be incorporated in
reflective semiotic use if, for example, it gets selected by a stage
designer who is looking for a shovel as a stage prop that will create a
very particular aura on stage. Thus, in the present scheme, a shovel
cannot be categorized absolutely; rather, we need to focus upon an
instance of use to be able to categorize it.
The two distinctions that we propose are not meant to be a final inte-
grative statement. Rather, these distinctions are put forward as an
attempt to review and take stock. In that spirit, we want to conclude
our stock-taking by considering a number of problematic issues that
will need to be considered in future theorizing.
First, many instances of tool use are highly semiotic. Driving a car,
even if absorbed in the act of driving, is a highly semiotic activity.
There are road signs, which mediate behaviour. Even the behaviours
of other drivers and pedestrians become signs (or more specifically,
using Mead’s terminology, symbols), which mediate the behaviour of
the driver. Does this mean that driving is not tool use? In order to deal
with this problem, we need to be very clear about what is in whose
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mind. The road sign is a semiotic mediator but the driver is not the one
who is using the sign communicatively. The local council that installed
the road sign has reflectively used the sign as a sign mediator of
drivers’ behaviour. The driver uses the sign as indicative of an
emerging road. The driver uses knowledge to interpret road signs. This
mode of use is usually non-reflective sign mediation. To the extent that
the driver is interpreting signs, we are dealing with sign mediation. But
the car itself is not being used to interpret the signs; rather, it is simply
being used as a tool. But, of course, this is not to say that the car cannot
be a sign. Indeed, any driver who pays attention to the appearance of
their car is concerned with it as a sign. The point, however, is that to
distinguish tools and signs means focusing on the micro details of the
here-and-now context, and who is using what and how.
Second, the distinction between mediation and reflective use can
also become messy in practice. Consider using a mirror: is it reflective
use? Although the mirror might stimulate self-reflection, this is not
necessarily reflection about the use of the mirror. It is important not to
confuse self-reflection in general with reflective use of resources. The
question to ask in each situation is: What is the object in the mind of
the actor? Reflective use entails having the resource or its use as an
object in mind. Non-reflective use entails the actor being aware of
something else.
Third, in cases where there is sign mediation directed at an inter-
locutor, that is, non-reflective use, it can be difficult to know whether
we are dealing with ‘use’ by the actor or ‘perception’ by the inter-
locutor. Consider the case of boys interacting with girls to solve a task
and using a masculine argumentative style to gain influence (Psaltis &
Duveen, 2006). Is the argumentative style being ‘used’ by the boys or
is it being ‘perceived’ by the girls? If, as suggested by Mead, creating
an impression in the mind of the other is the first step in the creation
of a sign, then can one say that creating such an impression is actually
a case of sign mediation or communication? In Vygotsky’s (1997)
example of the baby grasping, which the mother interprets as pointing,
is the baby engaged in sign mediation of the mind of the mother, or is
the mother using the baby’s grasping as a semiotic index of the child’s
desires?
Fourth, there are also situations in which an actor assumes that they
are using signs to create a specific meaning in the mind of an other, but,
like in the case of John, the meaning received, or the impression
created, is quite different from that which is expected. In such situ-
ations the actor is using a sign, in so far as they are intentionally
communicating. However, the action or communication is a symbolic
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index or cue for the interlocutors who find a different meaning. One
could call this extra or unintended meaning that is created in the minds
of observers ‘surplus meaning’ (Gillespie, 2003), and arguably, in so far
as the actor can become aware of this surplus meaning, then we are
witnessing the movement from action to symbol to significant symbol.
But in order to fully capture the dynamics of this surplus meaning in
an analysis, one has to consider each communicative act from the
various perspectives. Table 1 presents the act of use only from the
perspective of the actor.
Fifth, the study of using resources must be aware of the psy-
chologist’s fallacy (James, 1890). Namely, we must be careful to dis-
tinguish what is in the mind of actors from what is in the mind of
researchers. Table 1 suppresses the multi-perspective nature of social
life. Any time that these categorizations are used in the context of
research, there are at a minimum two perspectives, namely, the
perspective of the researched and the perspective of the researcher.
These two perspectives are evident in the table in the following way;
when talking about reflective use, the frame of reference is the
phenomenological perspective of the researched. Reflective use means
that the resource is an object in the mind of the actor. Mediation, on the
other hand, is not in the conscious mind of the researched. It only exists
consciously for the researcher forming an interpretation. Mediation is
something that the researcher sees in the activity analysed.
These two perspectives pave the way for further complexity.
Consider the case of a man uttering a prayer in an attempt to influence
the lottery numbers. From the perspective of the actor, the prayer is
being used to act upon the world (the number generator), and as such,
the prayer is being used as a tool. However, from the perspective of a
researcher who is sceptical about the efficacy of prayer in such a
context, the use of prayer might seem to have a different function.
Maybe the researcher interprets the use of prayer as a means to
maintain emotional security, to create feelings of control, or as a means
of wish fulfilment. In such cases the prayer is a semiotic resource, or
symbolic resource, being used non-reflectively to mediate the actor’s
own emotional state. Therefore, the research might argue for the prayer
as having a latent function. How can we include such divergent
perspectives in future theory?
Thus we conclude our article with more questions than answers.
While we have tried to review and consolidate our conceptualization
of using resources, it is clear that the task of theorizing our relation to
culture is not finished. We hope that these concluding concerns will
sensitize future theoretical and empirical research.
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